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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Partition Of Land By Grantee Of Easement
Baltimore G. & E. Co. v. Bowers'
Plaintiff is the grantee of an easement for an electric
transmission line conveyed by one of two tenants in
common. Defendants are the heirs and successors in title
of the two original tenants in common. These tenants in
common held the fee between themselves by application
of the rule in Shelley's Case, subject to a life estate in the
whole in the survivor. At the time of the grant of the
easement, in 1924, one tenant in common had died, and the
survivor held the entire possessory interest by reason of
the life estate in the whole. The survivor conveyed the
easement without the joinder of the heirs of the deceased
tenant in common. Because of this failure, only the heirs
of the granting tenant in common, and not the heirs of the
deceased tenant in common, had been held bound by the
grant as to an undivided one-half interest in the fee.2
In resisting an ejectment suit filed by the heirs of the
non-assenting tenant in common, the plaintiff sought an
order requiring the heirs of the granting cotenant to join
as party-plaintiffs in the plaintiff's bill for partition. The
Court of Appeals held that the grantee of this easement
from less than all of the cotenants had a right in equity to
require the grantor or her heirs to seek partition against
the non-assenting cotenant's heirs.3 In reaching this result,
the Court did not have to consider the question of prescrip-
tion since prescription, did not begin to run, against the
remaindermen, heirs of the non-assenting tenant in com-
mon, until these remaindermen were vested with posses-
sion. Under the deed, vesting of the right to possession
could not occur until the death of the survivor in 1943; and.
prescription could not have been completed before 1963.
The instant suit raises the issue of how the plaintiff
can preserve and protect its easement so as to receive the
full benefit of its grant and protect itself against the heirs
1221 Md. 337, 157 A. 2d 610 (1960).
IBurnham v. Gas & Electric Co., 217 Md. 507, 144 A. 2d 80 (1958), noted
19 Md. L. Rev. 43 (1959). There, by an application of the rule in Shelley's
Case, the Court held that the grant of the easement operated to bind the
heirs of the grantor as to an undivided one-half interest in the tract of
land as tenants in common with the heirs of the non-assenting tenant in
common, but did not bind the latter. Cf. Williams v. Armiger, 129 Md. 222,
98 A. 542 (1916).
8 Supra, n. 1.
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of the non-assenting tenant in common, who sued to eject
the plaintiff.4
The general rule5 appears to be that where the validity
of the easement is in dispute, the party claiming the ease-
ment is a proper and even a necessary party to the suit if
the conveyance by which the easement was granted is not
absolutely void. Previous to the instant suit, the heirs of
the non-assenting grantor had challenged the validity of
the easement by an ejectment suit, and it was held in the
previous litigation between the parties that the convey-
ance was valid only as to the grantor -and her heirs.6
The holding in the instant case that the grantee of the
easement has a right to require the grantor or her heirs to
seek partition against the non-assenting cotenant's heirs
is supported by Mee v. BenedictT where the Michigan
court held that although the grantee had no property right
in himself to support a partition suit, he did have a "right
in equity to require his grantor to sue for a partition of the
land," saying, inter alia:
".. . the only means of making that conveyance ef-
fectual to carry into effect the intent of the parties
was for said owners of timber to ask and obtain parti-
tion of the lands. This they had the right, and it was
their duty, to do, and equity would require and compel
action on their part to that end. * * *)
"We do not depart from the doctrine that such con-
veyance is void as against the cotenant, but it is void
only in so far as it affects the cotenant's rights. * * *
It is void so far as the cotenant's interest shall not be
injuriously affected by the conveyance; but it is not
void as against the grantor, and we think it is compe-
tent, under the general equity powers of the court, to
compel the grantor of a special interest to take such
steps as to make his conveyance effectual.""
Likewise, in Charleston C. & C. R. Co. v. Leech,9 the plain-
tiff, grantee of an easement from a cotenant owning a one-
third undivided interest in a tract of land, was held to be
entitled to an order requiring partition as upon an appli-
'Supra, n. 2.
5 68 C.J.S. 118, Partition, § 75.
6 Supra, n. 2.
'98 Mich. 260, 57 N.W. 175 (1893).
8 Id., 175-176.
9 33 S.C. 175, 11 S.E. 631 (1890).
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cation by the grantor, and, after the grantor's death, by
the successors in title.
There is authority in other jurisdictions" supporting
this view that the grantor can be compelled in equity to
"take such steps as having the common property parti-
tioned in order to make his conveyance effectual."" In
the Fourth Circuit,'2 the grantee of an easement from an
owner of a two-thirds interest in land was held entitled
"to have the land partitioned" so as to bind the grantor
and his heirs by allotting to them the portion of the land
on which the burden lies. Other cases cited by the Mary-
land Court of Appeals in the instant case are to the same
or similar effect.' 3
These cases rest on the Obvious proposition that an
easement would be worthless without a partition for it
would be ineffective against a tenant in common who did
not assent to the grant by his cotenant. 4 Under the rule
adopted in the instant case equity vests a right in the
grantee to effectuate his grant by bringing suit through
his grantor against a non-assenting tenant in common for
a partition.
Inasmuch as the grantor himself could seek partition
from his cotenant, 5 it is apparent that a grantee of his
entire estate derives this right." The grantee stands in the
grantor's shoes, but exercises only a derivative power.
This raises the question as to whether a grantee of a par-
10Harrell v. Mason, 170 Ala. 282, 54 So. 105 (1911); Pellow v. Arctic
Iron Co., 164 Mich. 87, 128 N.W. 918 (1910); Cook v. International &
G.N.R. Co., 3 Tex. Civ. App. 125, 22 S.W. 1012 (1893); 75 A.L.R. 1456
(1931).
n Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 121 F. 2d 318 (6th Cir. 1941).
'2Burdine v. Southern Public Utilities Co., 11 F. 2d 29 (4th Cir. 1926).13 Whitton v. Whitton, 38 N.H. 127 (1859) ; Jeter v. Knight, 81 S.C. 265,
62 S.E. 259 (1908) ; Hitt v. Caney Fork Gulf Coal Co., 124 Tenn. 84, 139
S.W. 693 (1911) ; Simpson-Feel Oil Co. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 136 Tex.
158, 125 S.W. 2d 263 (1939) ; Thomas v. Southern Settlement & Develop.
Co., 132 Tex. 413, 123 S.W. 2d 290 (1939) ; Jones v. Berg, 105 Wash. 69,
177 Pac. 712 (1919).
"I Susquehanna Co. v. St. Clair, 113 Md. 667, 672, 77 A. 2d 119, 121 (1910),
states the rule that '"one tenant in common has no right to alter or change
the property to the injury of the other without his assent." See also
Dugan v. Baltimore, 70 Md. 1, 16 A. 501 (1889). The authorities appear
to be uniform in holding that a cotenant cannot by himself grant an
easement that will bind his cotenants. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
(1952), § 6.12, 51; 2 TIFFANY, RRAi PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939), § 456; 86
C.J.S. 517, Tenancy in Common, § 111.
152 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 154; Tolson v. Bryan, 130 Md. 338, 344,
100 A. 366 (1917) ; Shipley v. Tome Institute, 99 Md. 520, 58 A. 200 (1904).
See supra, n. 10.10Harrell v. Mason, 170 Ala. 282, 54 So. 105, 106 (1911) ("[Grantee] has
the right to get the benefit of what he bought."). See also Cook v. Boehl,
188 Md. 581, 53 A. 2d 573 (1947).
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tial interest can exercise this power in his own name or in
the name of the grantor. The Court of Appeals did not
answer this question; it refused to decide whether a
grantee of an easement from one cotenant could be con-
sidered a concurrent owner, but reached the same result
by upholding his right to force his grantor to partition the
land. Equity thereby has safeguarded the easement if as-
sent to a partitioning is not forthcoming from a non-
assenting cotenant. If the grantee can not do directly in
his own name what is necessary to protect his interest, he
will be entitled to do it indirectly through his grantor.
The rules governing partition are simple. Where one co-
tenant conveys in fee simple his interest in an undivided
share of a definite parcel of property, the grantee thereof is
by right entitled to seek partition, and will be protected in
respect to partition proceedings, in cases where the rights
of the other cotenants are not prejudiced.'7 The rule ap-
plies independent of any statute" and is quoted in the
instant case with the statement that the "right of parti-
tion in kind existed and continues to exist independent
of statute" and, at common law, is "a matter of right,
except where .. . inconvenience or difficulty would not
formerly prevail to prevent it."'" On the contrary, the rule
that persons having interests in the property which do not
make them cotenants cannot maintain an action of parti-
tion2" apparently requires that a plaintiff seeking parti-
tion have a present possessory interest, legal or equitable,
in the land. Lacking such an interest, the plaintiff will be
" Highland Park Mfg. Co. v. Steele, 235 F. 465, 470 (4th Cir. 1916);
Finley v. Dubach, 105 Kan. 664, 185 P. 886 (1919) ; Pellow v. Artic Iron
Co., 164 Mich. 87, 128 N.W. 918 (1910) ; Lasater v. Ramirez, 212 S.W. 935(Tex. 1919) ; Boggess v. Meredity, 16 W. Va. 1, 28-29 (1879) ; 2 AMERICAN
LAW OF PRoPERTY (1952)) §§ 6.21, 6.22; 75 A.L.R. 1456 et 8eq. (1931).
1375 A.L.R. 1456 (1931); 68 C.J.S. 33-35, Partition, §§ 21, 22; 40 Am. Jur.
88-96. Partition, §§ 106-111; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939),§§ 473-476; 4 THOMPSON, RPAT PROPERrY (3rd ed. 1939), § 1984; WLKER,
LAW OF PARTITION (2nd ed. 1882), 4.19 Baltimore G. & E. Co. v. Bowers, 221 Md. 337, 343, 157 A. 2d 610 (1959).
At common law, only a coparcener had a right to partition. Later, by
31 HEN. 8, c. 1 (1539), joint tenants and tenants in common were granted
the right in their own name. This statute was extended by 32 HEN. 8, c. 32(1540), to all tenants for life or a term of years. In Maryland, MD. LAWs
1785, Ch. 72, merely declared the common law, as did MD. LAws 1831,
Ch. 311, and other legislation culminating in 2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 16,
§ 154. In Hardy v. Leager, 212 Md. 565, 130 A. 2d 737 (1957), the Court
held that an absolute right of partition exists independent of the statute.
The instant case, moreover, merely amplifies in whom the right exists and
the procedure for asserting the right. lit does not, however, decide whether
the plaintiff is a concurrent owner entitled by statute to partition.
0 Supra, ns. 18, 19. See also 2 AmEmIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY (1952), § 6.22,
100.
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denied the right to sue.21 Thus, it is manifest that a co-
tenant of a fee simple interest or his grantee may sue for
partition,22 and that a cotenant of a life estate or estate for
years may also sue; but partition, if granted, would not
affect the remaindermen.23
Although it is not entirely clear from the authorities,
a contrary rule has prevailed where a cotenant grants
to a third person the timber rights of his moiety. In
such a case, the grant cannot, as against the cotenants of
the grantor, create a cotenancy in the timber distinct from
the land, so as to enable the grantee to sue for partition
of the timber but not of the land. "Separate ownership of
timber or a stratum of minerals is not a cotenancy and
therefore the owner cannot bring a partition suit."25
There are two important considerations which the
Court leaves unanswered in the instant case. First, is
the plaintiff entitled to partition in his own right or must
he compel his grantors to bring a partition suit? Second,
if partition in kind is not feasible, and a sale is required,
how should the sale be made and the proceeds divided?
The Court found it was not required to decide whether
the plaintiff could sue for partition in his own name under
a Maryland statute giving an equity court the right to:
".... decree partition of any lands . . .or any right,
interest or estate therein . . .on the bill or petition
of any joint tenant, tenant in common, or any parcener
1126or any concurrent owner....
The question of whether the grantee of an easement
has a right to seek partition by suing in his own name was
answered in an Alabama case similar to the present suit.'
There, plaintiff was a grantee of timber rights from one
cotenant, and was held entitled to file a bill for partition,
not as a cotenant, but through equity's power to enforce
his right to benefit from what he had purchased. The
Court said, inter alia:
"... there is an old maxim that equity affords a remedy
wherever there is a right which cannot be enforced
21 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939), § 475, 476.
2Cook v. Boehl, 188 Md. 581, 53 A. 2d 555 (1947) ; Dugan v. Baltimore,
70 Md. 1, 16 A. 501 (1889) ; Gittings v. Worthington, 67 Md. 139, 9 A. 228
(1887) ; Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md. 571 (1870).
Supra, n. 16. 40 Am. Jur. 92, Partition, §§ 109, 110.
40 Am. Jur. 88, Partition, § 106.
212 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY (1952), § 6.22, 100.
2"2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 154.
Harrell v. Mason, 170 Ala. 282, 54 So. 105 (1911).
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in a court of law. The complainant having bought
the undivided interest in the timber cannot cut and
remove it without becoming liable to the other owners
of the lands; yet he has the right to get the benefit
of what he has bought. * * * He nevertheless has the
right to the timber on such part of the land as may be
set apart to his grantor, and for the maintenance of
this right must be allowed to prosecute a suit against
the grantor and the other cotenants ..... ,,21
A denial of partition in kind, however, would not
leave the plaintiff without protection of his easement. A
sale and division of the proceeds is permissible where the
evidence affirmatively demonstrates that the property is
not divisible in kind without loss or damage to the parties.29
The rationale for this rule lies in the fact that the common
law right to partition in kind produced many hardships
where partition destroyed the value of the land or was
impossible because of the location of the land itself. To
prevent these hardships, many states, including Maryland,
enacted legislation providing for a judicial sale of the
land with a division of the proceeds among the various
owners.3 0 "The proceeds of the sale take the place of the
land, and the respective rights of the cotenants to the
money are in proportion to the undivided interest of
each in the land."13 ' To this rule may be added two corol-
laries, that the person seeking a sale has the burden of
proof that the land is not partionable without injury to the
parties, and that the criteria for granting or denying a
sale is "whether the value of the share of each [co-owner]
in case of partition would be materially less than his share
of the money equivalent that could probably be obtained
for the whole. '3 2 The early Maryland case of Earle v.
Turton3" clearly states the rule which applies today:
"Or upon proof that the land could not be divided
without loss or injury to the parties, [the Court] could
have decreed a sale. * * * According to our construction
of the 99th section [now § 154] of the 16th Article, to
justify the court in passing a decree of sale in such
Id., 106106.
Earle v. Turton, 26 Md. 23 (1866).
Supra, n. 26.
40 Am. Jur. 73, Partition, § 83.
'Id., 74.
26i Md. 23 (1866).
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case, it ought to be satisfied by proof that the land
cannot be divided without loss or injury to the parties
interested.' 3 4
As a result of this decision, the trial court has been
ordered to appoint Commissioners to determine if the
land in controversy is partitionable in kind. If it is and
partition is decreed, the defendants will become separate
owners, and the heirs of the plaintiff's grantor will be
assigned that portion of the tract covered by plaintiff's
easement, thereby giving plaintiff full protection in the
exercise of its rights.
If, on the other hand, the land is not partitionable in
kind, a judicial sale can be decreed, whereby the entire
tract can be sold subject to plaintiff's easement and the
proceeds apportioned among the defendants, after de-
ducting from the share of the heirs of the plaintiff's grantor
the depreciation in the sale price caused by plaintiff's ease-
ment. Under such a sale, plaintiff would receive full
protection in the exercise of its easement as against the
purchaser.
H. RuTxmwoRD Tuii uLL III
M Id., 34.
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